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In the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
No. 12-398  
ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., ET AL.
 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY 
 
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 
This case presents the question whether certain hu-
man genetic materials are patent-eligible subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. 101.  The Court’s resolution of that 
question will significantly affect the work of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), which is 
responsible for issuing patents.  35 U.S.C. 2(a)(1).  The 
question presented is also of substantial importance to 
several other federal agencies, including the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention.   
STATEMENT 
1. Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 1 
et seq., provides that an inventor may obtain a patent on 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
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composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof,  *  *  *  subject to the conditions and re-
quirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. 101.  The provision 
thus “defines the subject matter that may be patented.”  
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  Congress 
cast the provision “in broad terms to fulfill the con-
stitutional and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts.’ ௘” Diamond v. Chakra-
barty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980); see J.E.M. Ag Supply, 
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130-131 
(2001). 
Section 101 is subject, however, to an “important im-
plicit exception”:  “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable.”  Mayo Collabo-
rative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1293 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (Mayo).  Such “manifestations of  *  *  *  nature” 
are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”  
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127, 130 (1948). 
2. a. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a molecule that 
encodes the instructions required by living cells to pro-
duce the proteins essential for their structure and func-
tion.  Pet. App. 257a-260a.  DNA directly or indirectly 
controls nearly every aspect of an organism’s physiolo-
gy.  The basic structure of DNA comprises two strands 
of four different repeating chemical units—adenine (A), 
thymine (T), guanine (G), and cytosine (C)—known as 
“nucleotides” or “bases.”  Id. at 257a.  These strands 
bind together and twist into a distinctive double helix.  
Id. at 258a.  The four standard nucleotides are chemical-
ly paired such that cytosine always binds with guanine, 
and adenine with thymine.  Ibid.  Because of the pre-
dictable way in which nucleotides pair, it is possible to 
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infer from a nucleotide sequence on one strand of DNA 
the corresponding nucleotide sequence with which it 
may bind.  Ibid.  Likewise, it is possible to infer from the 
nucleotide sequence of a DNA molecule the structure of 
the corresponding protein that the DNA segment “en-
codes,” i.e., instructs the cell to build.  Ibid. 
An organism’s complete set of DNA is its “genome.”  
Pet. App. 259a n.6.  With qualifications not relevant 
here, a “gene” is any section of DNA that, through its 
nucleotide sequence, governs the expression of a partic-
ular protein.  Id. at 258a.  Only certain portions of a 
gene’s nucleotide sequence, known as “exons,” code for 
the protein that the gene expresses.  Ibid.  The remain-
ing portions of the gene include non-protein-coding 
regulatory regions governing the manner and timing of 
a cell’s protein production, as well as non-coding inter-
vening sequences known as “introns.”  Ibid.   
b. Within a human body, DNA (“native DNA”) is 
packaged into chromosomes and bound with chromoso-
mal proteins.  Pet. App. 262a.  DNA can be extracted 
from its cellular environment through “any number of 
well-established laboratory techniques.”  Id. at 263a.  A 
particular DNA segment of interest, such as a gene, can 
then be excised from the extracted material.  The result 
of this laboratory process—a DNA molecule excised 
from the genome and separated from its cellular envi-
ronment—is commonly termed “isolated DNA.”  See, 
e.g., J.A. 755 (U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, col. 19, lines 8-
18 (filed May 5, 1998) (’282 patent)).  Once a DNA seg-
ment has been isolated, it can be studied and exploited 
in a laboratory.  For instance, isolated DNA can be used 
as diagnostic tools that target and bind to particular 
DNA segments—“probes”—and as aids in sequencing 
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and reproducing DNA—“primers.”  See Pet. App. 264a-
265a.  
Scientists can also manufacture a variety of artificial 
DNA molecules that alter or recombine raw genetic 
materials in new and useful ways.  For example, “com-
plementary DNA” (cDNA) molecules are synthetic mol-
ecules built by scientists to include, in a single contigu-
ous DNA segment, only the exons of a naturally occur-
ring gene, without the introns and regulatory regions 
that are normally interspersed with exon sequences in 
genomic DNA.  See Pet. App. 267a-269a.  cDNA mole-
cules are synthesized by taking advantage of the process 
by which DNA directs the creation of protein in a cell.  
During that process, the DNA double helix unzips, and a 
new molecule, ribonucleic acid (RNA), is formed by an 
enzyme that copies the now-single strand of DNA, 
matching the strand’s nucleotides with complementary 
nucleotides.  The introns are then spliced out of the 
RNA molecule, and the exons are joined in a contiguous 
strand, leaving a molecule known as “messenger RNA,” 
or “mRNA.”  Id. at 266a.  When this process occurs 
within a cell, the mRNA then provides instructions “for 
the assembly of a protein.”  Id. at 267a. 
In order to create cDNA, scientists use mRNA for a 
different purpose:  to generate a new DNA molecule 
that contains nucleotide sequences complementary to 
the mRNA’s nucleotides.  The resulting cDNA molecule 
includes the same exon sequences present in the original 
DNA strand but lacks the DNA’s intron and regulatory 
sequences.  Pet. App. 268a-269a.  Because they contain 
protein-coding nucleotides in uninterrupted form, 
cDNAs have a variety of uses.  For instance, they can be 
inserted into a cell in order to cause it to express a pro-
tein of interest.  Id. at 269a. 
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3. Since the early 1980s, the PTO has issued patents 
on a wide range of engineered DNA molecules and use-
ful genetic methods.  In 1982, the PTO began to issue 
patents that claimed cDNA molecules in combination 
with other genetic material.  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 
4,322,499 (filed Mar. 30, 1982).  In subsequent years, the 
PTO began to grant patents directed to isolated DNA.  
In 2001, in responding to public comments on pro-
posed revised examination guidelines concerning the 
“utility” requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101, the PTO issued 
its only written articulation of its views on isolated DNA 
patents.  See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).  The PTO stated that if the 
patent discloses a particular use for a gene—e.g., ex-
pressing a useful protein—then “an inventor’s discovery 
of a gene can be the basis for a patent on the genetic 
composition isolated from its natural state.”  Id. at 1093.  
The PTO explained that a DNA molecule that has been 
“isolated” in this way is not a product of nature “because 
that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form 
in nature.”  Ibid. 
4. a. In 2009, petitioners, a group of medical re-
searchers, associations, and patients, filed this action 
challenging 15 claims drawn from seven United States 
patents owned by, or exclusively licensed to, respond-
ents.1  The patents relate to the human genes known as 
Breast Cancer Susceptibility Genes 1 and 2, or 
                                                      
1 Petitioners named the PTO as a defendant with respect to consti-
tutional claims, but not with respect to the statutory claims at issue in 
this Court.  The district court dismissed the claims against the PTO, 
Pet. App. 355a-357a, and petitioners did not appeal that ruling.  The 
United States participated as amicus curiae in the court of appeals.  
As in this brief, the United States argued in the Federal Circuit that 
cDNA is patent-eligible but that isolated DNA is not. 
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“BRCA1” and “BRCA2.”2  See generally Pet. App. 297a-
310a.  Mutations in these genes are associated with 
significantly increased risks of breast and ovarian can-
cer.  Id. at 379a-380a.   
Several of the composition claims in the patents-in-
suit, including claim 2 of the ’282 patent, are limited to 
cDNAs that encode the BRCA proteins.  See Pet. App. 
426a.  Other claims at issue would encompass isolated 
but otherwise unmodified human genomic DNA.  For 
instance, claim 1 of the ’282 patent claims “[a]n isolated 
DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide,” or protein, “said 
polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO:2.”  Id. at 298a.  “SEQ ID NO:2” describes 
the amino-acid sequence of the BRCA1 protein as it 
occurs in nature.  See J.A. 755 (col. 19, lines 41-50).  The 
specification defines the term “isolated DNA” to include, 
as relevant here, both cDNAs and genomic DNA that 
has been “separated from other cellular components 
which naturally accompany a native human sequence” 
and “removed from its naturally occurring environ-
ment.”  Ibid. (col. 19, lines 8-18).  Accordingly, claim 1 of 
the ’282 patent encompasses any isolated DNA molecule 
that codes for the natural BRCA1 protein—including an 
ordinary BRCA gene isolated from a tissue sample tak-
en from any patient.   
b. The district court held that petitioners had stand-
ing to challenge respondents’ patents, Pet. App. 392a-
412a; that all of the challenged composition claims were 
invalid because they were directed to patent-ineligible 
products of nature, id. at 232a-357a; and that the chal-
lenged method claims were also invalid, id. at 344a-355a.  
                                                      
2 The United States is a co-owner of four of the patents-in-suit.  
Pet. App. 377a n.4.  In 1995, the government granted an exclusive 
license under those patents to respondent Myriad.   
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5. a. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed 
in relevant part and remanded.  Pet. App. 120a-231a.  
The court of appeals unanimously held that the district 
court had declaratory-judgment jurisdiction because “at 
least one” petitioner, Dr. Ostrer, had standing.  Id. at 
9a, 28a-41a, 148a-158a.  The court unanimously held that 
cDNA molecules are patent-eligible.  Id. at 169a, 192a-
193a, 225a.  A majority of the panel also concluded that 
isolated DNA is patent-eligible.  Id. at 159a-172a; id. at 
193a-212a (Moore, J., concurring).3   
b. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
(No. 11-725).  While that petition was pending, this 
Court issued its decision in Mayo, supra.  Mayo con-
cerned diagnostic method claims that “purport[ed] to 
apply” what this Court characterized as “natural laws 
describing the relationships between” the blood concen-
tration of certain metabolites and appropriate drug 
dosage.  132 S. Ct. at 1294.  This Court held that the 
method claims were invalid because they did not contain 
elements “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 
natural law itself.”  Ibid.  The Court then granted the 
petition in No. 11-725, vacated the court of appeals’ 
judgment, and remanded for further proceedings in 
light of Mayo.  Id. at 1794.     
6. On remand, the same panel reaffirmed its earlier 
conclusions, principally for the same reasons it had 
previously given.  Pet. App. 1a-119a.  The court held 
that certain of the challenged claims were limited to 
cDNA molecules, and that such molecules are patent-
eligible because they are synthesized by scientists.  Id. 
at 47a n.9, 54a, 80a-81a, 113a-114a.  Judges Lourie and 
                                                      
3 The court of appeals also held that all but one of respondents’ 
method claims were invalid.  Pet. App. 62a-70a, 172a-179a.     
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Moore concluded that isolated DNA is patent-eligible, 
each offering different reasons for that conclusion.  
Judge Bryson dissented from that holding.  
Judge Lourie reasoned that isolated genes “are 
markedly different—have a distinctive chemical struc-
ture and identity—from those found in nature.”  Pet. 
App. 50a-51a.  He explained that separating DNA from 
the human body entails breaking chemical bonds, and 
that the separated “portion [of DNA] never exists as a 
separate molecule in the body or anywhere else in na-
ture, and may have an entirely different utility.”  Id. at 
57a.  Judge Lourie also invoked the “longstanding prac-
tice of the PTO,” noting that “Congress has not indicat-
ed that the PTO’s position is inconsistent with [Sec-
tion] 101.”  Id. at 62a.   
Judge Moore did not join Judge Lourie’s opinion with 
respect to isolated DNA, but instead concurred in the 
judgment.  Pet. App. 73a-96a.  In her view, isolated 
DNA could be patent-eligible only if, in addition to the 
chemical differences highlighted by Judge Lourie, iso-
lated DNA had greater utility than native DNA.  Id. at 
82a-83a.  She concluded that shorter isolated DNA seg-
ments had the necessary additional utility because they 
could be used as primers and probes.  Id. at 83a-84a.  
Judge Moore viewed “longer strands of isolated DNA” 
as presenting a closer question because those strands do 
not clearly involve increased utility “as compared to 
nature.”  Id. at 85a-86a.  She ultimately concluded, how-
ever, that the court should not disturb the “settled ex-
pectations” and “extensive property rights” engendered 
by the PTO’s practice of allowing patents on such se-
quences.  Id. at 86a.   
Judge Bryson dissented, concluding that isolated 
DNA is not patent-eligible.  Pet. App. 98a-119a.  In his 
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view, Mayo suggested that “[i]n cases such as this one, 
in which the applicant claims a composition of matter 
that is nearly identical to a product of nature, it is ap-
propriate to ask whether the applicant has done ‘enough’ 
to distinguish his alleged invention from the similar 
product of nature.”  Id. at 112a.  Judge Bryson would 
have held that isolated DNA did not satisfy that stand-
ard because “[t]he only material change made to those 
genes from their natural state is the change that is nec-
essarily incidental to the extraction of the genes from 
the environment in which they are found in nature.”  Id. 
at 102a.  Judge Bryson also disagreed with the majori-
ty’s reliance on the PTO’s practice of issuing isolated 
DNA patents and the “expectations of the inventing 
community.” Id. at 119a.  He explained that such consid-
erations could not override the rule against patenting 
products of nature.  Ibid.    
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Synthesized genetic materials such as cDNA are pa-
tent-eligible subject matter because they do not occur in 
nature but instead are the product of significant human 
creativity.  By contrast, isolated but otherwise unmodi-
fied DNA is not patent-eligible.  The public’s ability to 
study and use native DNA would be unduly compro-
mised if changes caused by the extraction of naturally-
occurring substances from their native environments 
were sufficient to trigger patent-eligibility.  And while 
the process of isolating DNA entails physical changes, 
those changes do not significantly alter the structure or 
function of the relevant DNA segments.   
A.  Under this Court’s longstanding precedents, laws 
and products of nature cannot be patented.  That is so 
even if significant effort and creativity are required to 
discover the natural law or substance and to appreciate 
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its potential utility.  A patent may be issued for a modi-
fied natural substance if the modified version is suffi-
ciently different from its naturally occurring antecedent 
and the other statutory requirements for patentability 
are satisfied.  In deciding whether a particular modified 
substance is patent-eligible under these standards, a 
court should ask, inter alia, whether issuance of a pa-
tent would have the practical effect of preempting all 
use of the underlying natural substance. 
B.  Artificial DNA molecules such as cDNAs are pa-
tent-eligible inventions.  Creating cDNA requires signif-
icant manipulation and alteration of naturally occurring 
genetic materials rather than simply the extraction of 
those materials from their native environment.  Issuing 
patents on cDNA creates no risk of preempting other 
uses of the raw materials from which cDNA is created. 
C.  Isolated but otherwise unmodified genomic DNA 
is not patent-eligible.  In their naturally occurring 
state—i.e., as a portion of a larger native strand within a 
cell, which in turn is located within the human body—
the DNA molecules claimed in respondents’ patents are 
products of nature.  The process of isolation does not 
transform those molecules into human-made inventions.   
As with many naturally occurring substances, the 
process of “isolating” a particular DNA segment chang-
es the molecule’s physical structure to a degree (since 
the ends of the segment must be “snipped” in order to 
remove it from the cell of which it is a part) and increas-
es its utility (since isolation allows researchers to study 
and exploit it in a laboratory).  Those changes, however, 
are simply inherent consequences of removing the origi-
nal substance from its natural environment.  Since isola-
tion is a prerequisite to meaningful productive use of 
native DNA, treating such changes as sufficient to sup-
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port patent-eligibility would effectively preempt the 
public’s use of the underlying product of nature. 
Congress’s failure to amend the Patent Act to fore-
close the patenting of isolated DNA does not imply con-
gressional approval of such patents.  Since the 1980s, 
the PTO has issued patents on both isolated DNA and 
cDNA.  It was not until 2001, however, that the PTO 
issued its first written explanation of its view that iso-
lated DNA is patent-eligible, and that view was not 
tested in court until this litigation commenced.  This 
case is therefore unlike prior patent-law disputes where 
the Court has given weight to reliance interests engen-
dered by established judicially-created doctrines.  
The court of appeals also suggested that factors spe-
cific to the biotechnology industry supported a narrow 
view of the product-of-nature exception to patent-
eligibility.  This Court has eschewed that sort of indus-
try-specific approach to patent-eligibility, preferring 
instead to establish general rules designed to strike an 
appropriate balance between competing objectives.  One 
such rule is that patents may not be issued on products 
of nature, even though such products may benefit the 
public, and even though the availability of patents would 
increase the incentives for researchers to discover such 
substances and ascertain their useful properties.  The 
determination whether such rules should be modified in 
their application to particular industries or categories of 
inventions has traditionally been left to Congress.  And 
the product-of-nature exception itself serves important 
public purposes (including incentives for innovation), 
since an overbroad conception of patent-eligibility could 
unduly restrict the public’s study and productive use of 




SYNTHESIZED GENETIC MATERIALS SUCH AS cDNA 
MOLECULES ARE PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER, 
WHILE ISOLATED BUT OTHERWISE UNMODIFIED GE-
NOMIC DNA IS NOT  
Petitioners contend that respondents’ claims to 
cDNA molecules and to isolated but otherwise unmodi-
fied DNA are directed to patent-ineligible products of 
nature.  In the government’s view, cDNA is patent-
eligible under Section 101 because it must be synthe-
sized from other genetic materials, a process that in-
volves significant manipulation and leaves the public 
free to exploit the underlying natural substances used to 
create cDNA.  Isolated DNA, by contrast, is not patent-
eligible because it has merely been “isolated”—i.e., 
extracted from its cellular environment and separated 
from extraneous material—rather than significantly 
altered by human intervention.  Because the differences 
between isolated and native DNA are simply the neces-
sary consequences of removing DNA from its natural 
environment, and DNA must be isolated before it can be 
exploited, respondents’ isolated DNA claims threaten to 
preempt the use of the underlying native DNA.  See 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).  To prevent that result, the mere 
act of culling a natural product from its environment 
to exploit its preexisting natural qualities—however 
useful those qualities may be—should be treated as 
insufficient to create patent-eligible subject matter. 
The PTO has regularly issued patents directed to iso-
lated genomic DNA, and various government agencies 
have previously sought and obtained such patents.  The 
patent-eligibility of isolated DNA was never tested in 
litigation, however, until petitioners filed this suit.  Be-
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fore the district court, the government, in the course of 
defending against petitioners’ constitutional claims, 
stated that “the USPTO’s position” on whether “DNA 
molecules” are patent-eligible “remains as set forth in 
its Utility Guidelines.”  PTO Reply Br. at 11, Docket 
entry No. 245, 09-cv-4515 (Jan. 29, 2010).  The district 
court’s judgment in this case, however, prompted the 
United States to reevaluate whether such patents are 
consistent with the settled principle that patent protec-
tion does not extend to products of nature.  Based on 
that review, the United States concluded that, although 
the PTO has properly issued patents on cDNA and other 
synthesized genetic materials, isolated DNA is not pa-
tent-eligible subject matter.4   
A. Section 101 Embraces Only “Human-Made Inventions” 
That Do Not Monopolize Laws Or Products Of Nature 
1. Section 101 of Title 35 broadly permits an inventor 
to obtain a patent on “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”  35 
U.S.C. 101.  “[A]s a matter of statutory stare decisis 
going back 150 years,” however, the provision’s scope 
has been limited by an implicit exception under which 
“[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ide-
as” are not patentable.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3225 (2010); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.  Such mani-
festations of nature are “free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.”  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
                                                      
4 The court of appeals correctly held that the district court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioners’ claims.  Pet. App. 25a, 32a-41a. 
Dr. Ostrer has standing to challenge the validity of respondents’ 
patents because his research activities are constrained by respond-
ents’ assertion of their rights under allegedly invalid patents.  See 
Already, LLC v. Nike, No. 11-982 (Jan. 9, 2013), slip op. 5; 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118, 126-137 (2007). 
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303, 309 (1980) (citation omitted).  Thus, “ ௘a new mineral 
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild 
is not patentable subject matter,” even though the dis-
covery and acquisition of the mineral or plant, and the 
identification of its useful properties, may have required 
significant effort and ingenuity.  Ibid.; see, e.g., Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-186 (1981).  
The Court has recognized, however, that “all inven-
tions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or 
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 
ideas.”  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.  While one cannot 
patent a “new plant found in the wild,” Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 309, modifications of plant substances found in 
nature, as well as new plants bred from existing ones, 
may be patent-eligible.  See J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130-131, 134 
(2001) (J.E.M. Ag Supply).  The patent-eligibility of a 
modified natural substance depends on whether the 
modified substance is so “markedly” different from its 
natural predecessor as to warrant the conclusion that 
the claimant has invented something new.  Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 309-310; cf. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (process 
claim that “add[ed] nothing of significance to the natural 
laws themselves” was invalid).   
2. This Court has twice considered whether a sub-
stance derived from nature falls within the product-of-
nature exception to Section 101.  In Chakrabarty, the 
Court held that a genetically engineered microorganism 
useful for digesting oil spills was patent-eligible because 
it had “markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature and [had] the potential for significant 
utility.”  447 U.S. at 309-310 (emphasis added).  The 
inventor had altered a naturally occurring bacterium by 
transferring to it several plasmids that altered the bac-
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terium’s structure and imbued it with the ability to 
break down crude oil—a “property[] which [was] pos-
sessed by no naturally occurring bacteria.”  Id. at 305.  
It was the “markedly different” characteristics of the 
modified substance that made it useful.  The Court 
therefore concluded that the patentee’s “discovery is not 
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is pa-
tentable subject matter under [Section] 101.”  Id. at 310. 
By contrast, in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoc-
ulant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), the Court held that natu-
ral strains of root-nodule bacteria were not patent-
eligible.  The patentee had “discovered that there exist-
ed in nature certain species of root-nodule bacteria 
which did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each 
other.”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.  He accordingly 
created a mixed culture containing several such species, 
which could be used to inoculate the seeds of several 
different types of plants at once.  Ibid.; see Funk Broth-
ers, 333 U.S. at 130.  The Court emphasized that, alt-
hough the patentee had discovered the bacteria strains’ 
natural properties, he had not altered the bacteria in 
any way.  Id. at 131.  In addition, although the bacteria 
within the mixed culture had applications that single 
strains did not—in that the culture could be used to 
inoculate multiple types of plants at once—the Court 
emphasized that, within the culture, the unaltered “bac-
teria perform[ed] in their natural way.”  Ibid.    
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers thus establish that, 
although an inventor may not obtain a patent merely by 
discovering the existence or useful properties of a natu-
ral substance, patents may be issued on new substances 
created out of naturally occurring raw materials. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310; Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. 
at 131.   Since Chakrabarty, however, the Court has not 
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had occasion to further elaborate on the nature or extent 
of the modifications that may be sufficient to warrant 
the conclusion that a substance derived from a natural 
product is sufficiently different from nature to be con-
sidered a man-made invention. 
3. Although this Court’s decision in Mayo concerned 
process rather than composition claims, it provides 
useful guidance for determining whether particular 
modifications to a naturally occurring substance are 
sufficient to render the modified substance patent-
eligible.  
In Mayo, the Court addressed a therapeutic meth-
od patent based on the correlation between patient 
metabolite levels after administering a drug and the 
likely safety and efficacy of that drug.  132 S. Ct. at 
1294.  The Court held that the patent was invalid 
because the correlation was a law of nature and the 
patent posed a risk of “disproportionately tying up” 
its future uses.  Ibid.  The Court explained that the 
“basic underlying concern” of the natural-law excep-
tion to Section 101 is that patentees must not be al-
lowed, through “drafting effort[s],” to “monopolize 
the law of nature itself.”  Id. at 1297, 1302.  When a 
claimed process is centered on a natural law, the 
method as a whole therefore must “contain other 
elements  *  *  *  sufficient to ensure that the patent 
in practice amounts to significantly more than a pa-
tent upon the natural law itself.”  Id. at 1294; see, e.g., 
id. at 1301.   
Not every nuance of Mayo’s process-claim analysis 
applies directly to patents directed to compositions of 
matter.  The law-of-nature and product-of-nature 
exceptions to Section 101 do, however, reflect the 
same basic principle:  a person should not receive a 
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patent for simply discovering the existence and useful 
properties of something that already exists in nature.  
See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (both plants in the 
wild and mathematical laws are “manifestations of  
.  .  .  nature”) (citation omitted).  A composition claim 
that effectively prevents the public from studying and 
using a product of nature is just as objectionable as a 
method claim that prevents the public from studying 
and exploiting a law of nature.   
Mayo thus suggests that, in determining whether a 
modified natural product is “markedly different” from 
the underlying natural substance and therefore pa-
tent-eligible, one relevant question is whether a pa-
tent on the modified product would have the practical 
effect of preempting the public’s ability to use the 
underlying natural substance.  If so, then the differ-
ences between the claimed invention and the underly-
ing natural substance are not sufficient to render the 
composition patent-eligible.  See 132 S. Ct. at 1294.  
This inquiry into preemptive effect is not an exclusive 
test of the patent-eligibility of a product derived from 
nature.  The patent at issue in Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. 
at 130, for example, was held invalid even though it 
would not have prevented exploitation of any single 
strain of bacteria.  But Mayo indicates that, at a mini-
mum, a substance derived from a product of nature 
should not be considered patent-eligible if the patent 
would have the effect of preempting all uses of the un-
derlying natural substance. 
In particular, extending patent eligibility to a mod-
ified natural substance may risk “tying up” the under-
lying natural substance when the differences between 
the modified and original substances consist of noth-
ing more than the necessary consequences of remov-
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ing the substance from its natural environment.  Re-
moving a product of nature from its natural surround-
ings is often a prerequisite to any serious study or 
commercial exploitation of that product.  When that is 
so, and the act of removal would necessarily result in 
the creation of a patented composition, the patent 
risks preempting all future uses of the natural prod-
uct.  It therefore does not “in practice amount[] to 
significantly more than a patent on the natural [prod-
uct] itself.”  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
B. Artificial DNA Molecules, Including cDNAs, Are Hu-
man-Made Inventions Eligible For Patent Protection 
cDNA molecules are synthesized nucleotide sequenc-
es that contain only the exons of a naturally occurring 
gene.  With exceptions not relevant here (such as retro-
viruses that use cDNA-like structures to replicate them-
selves), cDNA molecules generally do not occur in na-
ture, either in isolation or as contiguous sequences con-
tained within longer natural molecules.  Pet. App. 268a.  
To create cDNA, a scientist therefore does not simply 
remove existing cDNA from its natural environment.  
Rather, scientists must synthesize cDNA from other 
genetic materials, a process that involves significant 
manipulation of the underlying natural substances to 
create a substance that is new and different.  See p. 4, 
supra.  The resulting cDNA molecule has a different 
nucleotide sequence than DNA created naturally within 
the cell, and (because it lacks introns) it is “preferable” 
to isolated DNA for many laboratory uses.  See Bruce 
Alberts et al., Molecular Biology of the Cell 504 (Gar-
land Science 4th ed. 2002). 
Extending patent protection to cDNAs therefore 
poses no risk of “tying up” other uses of the natural raw 
materials involved in the creation of cDNA.  Mayo, 132 
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S. Ct. at 1294.  A patent on a particular cDNA molecule 
leaves others free to study and exploit the original na-
tive DNA, RNA, and mRNA molecules that were used to 
create the cDNA.  Those substances can be removed 
from their cellular environment and studied without 
creating the patented cDNA molecule, and they can be 
altered in ways that do not result in the creation of the 
cDNA.  cDNA is thus analogous to the genetically modi-
fied bacterium in Chakrabarty.  Upholding the patent on 
that bacterium did not prevent others from investigating 
or experimenting upon the original, naturally occurring 
micro-organism.  See 447 U.S. at 310.  
Petitioners contend (Br. 49-53) that cDNAs are not 
patent-eligible because they contain the same protein-
coding information—i.e., exon sequences—as DNA in 
the body.  But the properties of any product originally 
derived from nature, including the bacterium in 
Chakrabarty, can be traced to the operation of natural 
principles.  While the coding properties of cDNA mole-
cules’ exons are determined by nature, those properties 
operate within a molecule (a DNA strand with the regu-
latory and intron regions spliced out) that does not exist 
in nature and that has increased utility relative to natu-
rally occurring genetic materials or isolated but unmodi-
fied DNA.  The fact that a cDNA incorporates nucleo-
tide sequences whose significance is derived from nature 
therefore does not mean that the molecule as a whole is 
a product of nature.5  See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.    
                                                      
5 It is possible that, given the prevailing level of knowledge in bio-
technological fields, future patent applications directed to cDNAs and 
other synthesized DNA molecules may be rejected as obvious.  35 
U.S.C 103; see In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358-1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2009).   
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C. Isolated But Otherwise Unmodified Genomic DNA Is 
Not Patent-Eligible  
Respondents’ claims directed to isolated DNA are in-
valid under Section 101.  Isolated DNA is simply natu-
rally occurring DNA that has been extracted from its 
cellular environment and separated from extraneous 
material.  The differences between isolated DNA and 
native DNA within a cell are merely the inherent and 
necessary results of removing the DNA from its natural 
environment.  Because the removal process is a prereq-
uisite to any exploitation of native DNA, respondents’ 
isolated DNA claims are the practical equivalent of 
patents on the underlying naturally occurring BRCA 
genes themselves. 
1. Isolated DNA is not markedly different from native 
DNA  
a. Respondents’ composition claims are directed to 
“isolated” DNA molecules that have been extracted 
from their natural cellular environment and excised 
from other portions of the gene.  Absent the “isolated” 
limitation, claim 1 of the ’282 patent, for example, would 
encompass the native BRCA1 gene in the human body, 
which “cod[es] for a BRCA1 polypeptide.”6  Pet. App. 
426a.  In their pre-isolation form—i.e., as a portion of a 
larger native gene within a cell—the BRCA sequences 
clearly are products of nature.  Independent of any 
                                                      
6 Several of the disputed claims, including claim 1 of the ’282 pa-
tent, are framed in functional terms that would additionally encom-
pass non-naturally occurring variations of the BRCA genes and 
related cDNAs.  But because the challenged claims in respondents’ 
patents encompass the isolated natural gene as well, they are invalid 
under Section 101.  See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 
775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
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human intervention, BRCA genes exist within the hu-
man genome and, together with the rest of the genome 
and other materials, are packaged into chromosomes 
within each cell.  Id. at 262a.  Also independent of hu-
man intervention, the unique nucleotide sequence of 
BRCA genes induces human cells to express the BRCA1 
protein, and certain mutations in that sequence are 
associated with an increased risk of cancer. 
As the court of appeals recognized, the process of ex-
cising a selected portion of DNA from its cellular envi-
ronment results in a molecule that is distinct from native 
DNA in certain respects.  Pet. App. 51a-52a; see id. at 
308a-309a.  The isolated DNA segment is structurally 
different from native DNA, in that each end of the iso-
lated DNA segment is no longer bonded to the rest of 
the gene.  Id. at 51a-52a.  Within the isolated DNA seg-
ment, however, the nucleotide sequence (which contains 
both the protein-coding exons and non-coding sequenc-
es) is unchanged.  Id. at 20a.   
Although isolated DNA has applications that native 
DNA does not, that is a consequence of the fact that 
DNA, once isolated, can be manipulated by scientists in 
a laboratory.   Isolated DNA can be sequenced and ana-
lyzed.  Shorter isolated strands may also be used, with 
some modifications, as probes, which are used to target 
and bind to a particular DNA segment, and primers, 
which can be used to help determine the order of nucleo-
tides in a DNA molecule.  Pet. App. 264a-265a, 269a-
270a.  All of these applications depend on the fact that 
isolated DNA’s nucleotide sequence is identical to that 
of the same gene segment as it exists within a cell, so 
that the isolated DNA binds with the same complemen-
tary nucleotide sequences as it would in non-isolated 
form.  Ibid.   
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b. These distinctions between isolated and native 
DNA do not render isolated DNA “markedly different” 
from native DNA.   
The structural difference between isolated DNA and 
native DNA—the isolated segment’s “snipped” ends—
has no functional consequences.  That truncation does 
not alter any of the operative properties of the isolated 
DNA segment.  In particular, the nucleotide sequence 
that determines the binding and coding properties of a 
given DNA segment is exactly the same after the seg-
ment has been isolated as it was when it existed as part 
of the genome in the human body.  Judge Lourie viewed 
the fact that “[i]solated DNA has been cleaved (i.e., had 
covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed)” as 
sufficient to render isolated DNA patent-eligible.  Pet. 
App. 51a, 53a-54a.  But if a structural change that leaves 
the natural substance’s operative properties entirely 
untouched were sufficient in itself to support patent-
eligibility, the removal of a kidney from the body might 
render the extracted kidney patent-eligible.7  Id. at 107a 
(Bryson, J., dissenting).   
                                                      
7 Judge Lourie emphasized that the distinct structure of isolated 
DNA manifests itself at the molecular level.  Pet. App. 51a-52a, 54a-
55a, 57a.  But there is no sound reason that “it should make a differ-
ence, for purposes of patentability, whether the isolated substance is 
part of a single molecule  *  *  *  or part of a very large aggregation of 
molecules, as in the case of a kidney.”  Id. at 107a (Bryson, J., dis-
senting); cf. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (refusing to distinguish between 
narrow and broad natural laws for patent-eligibility purposes).  
Judge Lourie also concluded that isolated DNA, unlike an extracted 
kidney, warrants patent protection because isolating DNA requires 
“extensive research” and skill.  Pet. App. 60a.  That reasoning con-
flates the patent-eligibility of the extraction method with that of the 
resulting isolated substance.  The process of extracting a segment of 
DNA (now well understood in the art) was undoubtedly patent- 
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The fact that isolated DNA has additional applica-
tions likewise does not render it markedly different 
from native DNA.  The “additional utility” on which the 
concurring judge below relied (Pet. App. 82a-84a) is 
simply the ability of researchers to study and exploit in 
a laboratory the inherent natural properties that isolat-
ed DNA shares with native DNA.  For two of the com-
position claims at issue here, the relevant compositions 
of matter are defined by the natural biological function 
they perform in the human body:  the capacity to ex-
press BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins.  See id. at 426a-
427a.  
Indeed, the isolated gene is important to respondents 
and the medical community precisely because isolated 
DNA operates in exactly the same way in a laboratory 
as it does in its natural environment.  Thus, human ma-
nipulation has resulted only in an increased ability to 
exploit the DNA segment’s natural properties, rather 
than in increased utility arising from altered properties.  
In this respect as well, isolated DNA is analogous to a 
kidney removed from the body or a plant obtained from 
the wild, and is unlike the modified bacterium in 
Chakrabarty, which had additional utility arising from 
the non-natural properties created by human interven-
tion.   
These differences between isolated and native DNA 
cannot render isolated DNA patent-eligible.  “The only 
material change made to [isolated] genes from their 
natural state is the change that is necessarily incidental 
to the extraction of the genes from the environment in 
which they are found in nature.”  Pet. App. 102a 
                                                      
eligible when it was first conceived.  But the effort required to dis-
cover or obtain a naturally occurring substance does not make that 
substance patent-eligible.  See Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 131.  
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(Bryson, J., dissenting).  That isolation process is gener-
ally a prerequisite to any serious study or exploitation of 
the underlying native DNA.8  See, e.g., Principles and 
Techniques of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology 164 
(Keith Wilson & John Walker, eds., 7th ed. 2010); Bur-
ton E. Tropp, Molecular Biology: Genes to Proteins 151-
152 (4th ed. 2012).  Many “future use[s]” of native BRCA 
DNA segments therefore may infringe respondents’ 
patents.9  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302.  By claiming the 
substance that necessarily results from removing DNA 
from its cellular environment—the first, necessary step 
in studying or further exploiting the DNA—
respondents’ isolated DNA claims “risk disproportion-
ately tying up the use of the underlying natural” prod-
ucts.  Id. at 1294.  Respondents’ claimed isolated DNA 
therefore is not “markedly different” from native DNA, 
and respondents’ isolated DNA claims are invalid.  
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.   
The need to “isolate” a natural substance in order to 
study or exploit it is hardly unique to DNA.  Many 
natural products—coal beneath the earth, cotton fibers 
mixed with cotton seeds, the stigmas of the saffron 
flower—must be physically separated, i.e., “isolated,” 
from their environments before becoming useful to 
mankind.  Similarly, many highly reactive elements on 
the periodic table, such as lithium, boron, and barium, 
                                                      
8 DNA sequencing technologies rely on first isolating and break-
ing down DNA into segments shorter than—and thus potentially 
contained within—the claimed BRCA segments.  See, e.g., Thom-
as Kepler et al., Metastasizing patent claims on BRCA1, 95 
Genomics 312-314 (2010).  
9 Anyone who isolates either BRCA gene, or any fragment thereof 
that is at least 15 nucleotides long, would infringe one or more of 
respondents’ claims.  See Pet. App. 426a. 
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occur in nature only in chemical compounds.  The 
isolation of lithium and other elemental metals marked 
significant scientific achievements.  Under Section 101 
and its statutory predecessors, however, the isolation of 
such substances from their natural environments has 
not been viewed as the “invention” of a new patent-
eligible “manufacture” or “composition of matter.”  
Indeed, courts in the early part of the 20th century 
repeatedly rejected claims for isolated natural elements 
as new “manufacture[s].”10  See, e.g., General Elec. Co.  
v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642-643 (3d Cir. 
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1929); In re Marden, 
47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931).   
c.  Respondents have argued (Resps. C.A. Br. 36-40), 
and the concurring judge below agreed (Pet. App. 76a-
78a), that isolated DNA is patent-eligible as a “purified” 
natural substance.  They rely on early lower-court deci-
sions upholding patents on natural compounds that have 
been so refined and purified through human interven-
tion as to become a substance different “in kind” from 
the natural product.  See, e.g., Kuehmsted v. 
Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 
1910) (purified aspirin had “therapeutically different” 
properties from impure substance), cert. denied, 220 
U.S. 622 (1911); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 
189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff ௘’d in part and rev’d in 
                                                      
10 The court of appeals viewed isolated elements as distinguishable 
from isolated DNA because isolated elements reflect “a simple sepa-
ration from extraneous materials,” Pet. App. 59a, and represent 
“basic building block[s] provided by nature,” id. at 90a n.7 (Moore, J., 
concurring).  But the isolation of elements, like the isolation of DNA, 
merely reflects the modifications inherent in removing the relevant 
natural substance from its environment.  In neither context does the 
fact of isolation create a new patent-eligible substance.   
26 
 
part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912); see also In re Merz, 97 
F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938).   
Those decisions indicate that certain purification pro-
cesses—i.e., processes that involve human manipulation 
of a substance that has been removed in impure form 
from its natural environment—may sometimes result in 
an altered substance that has structural features and/or 
operative properties that render the product markedly 
different from the impure substance that occurs in na-
ture.  For instance, cDNA could be thought of as a “pu-
rified” gene, as it incorporates into a single contiguous, 
synthetic molecule only the coding regions of the natu-
rally occurring gene.  But isolated DNA reflects no such 
transformation.  As explained above, isolated DNA has 
simply been removed from its natural environment with-
in the human body, with minor structural changes that 
have no effect on its intrinsic properties, so that those 
properties may be observed and exploited in a laborato-
ry setting.  To label the process of removing DNA from 
a cell “purification,” and to hold the culled DNA seg-
ments patent-eligible on that ground, would “make pa-
tent eligibility depend simply on the draftsman’s art,” 
without reference to the nature and extent of the under-
lying transformation, or the consequences for the pub-
lic’s ability to use the underlying substance.  See Mayo, 
132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
2. Neither the PTO’s practice of issuing patents for iso-
lated DNA, nor Congress’s failure to overturn that 
practice, provides a sufficient reason to hold that iso-
lated DNA is patent-eligible   
a. Respondents argued below, and the concurring 
judge agreed, that Congress’s failure to amend the Pa-
tent Act implies congressional endorsement of the 
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PTO’s practice of granting patents for isolated DNA 
molecules.  Pet. App. 86a-94a (Moore, J., concurring).  
Since the 1980s, the PTO has issued patents on isolated 
DNA, as well as on patent-eligible genetic materials 
such as cDNAs.11  Id. at 87a-88a.  As a general matter, 
however, the agency has historically viewed isolation 
standing alone as an insufficient basis for finding modi-
fied natural substances to be patent-eligible.  See, e.g., 
Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Patent 123, 127 
(1889) (fiber extracted from pine-tree needles “can no 
more be the subject of a patent in its natural state when 
freed from its surroundings than wheat which has been 
cut by a reaper”); see also Ex parte Berkman, 90 
U.S.P.Q. 398, 401 (1951). 
After the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court issued 
decisions that could be read to support the patent-
eligibility of natural substances removed from their 
environment, see In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 
1979), vacated in part, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), and this 
Court held the modified organism in Chakrabarty to be 
patent-eligible, the PTO began to issue patents on iso-
lated DNA.  In 2001, the PTO issued its first written 
explanation of that practice.  In response to comments 
concerning proposed revisions to its Utility Examination 
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001), the PTO 
stated that an isolated DNA molecule is not a product of 
nature “because that DNA molecule does not occur in 
                                                      
11 Given the different terminology used in different patents, it is 
difficult to estimate the number of patents issued for isolated DNA.  
The court of appeals stated that approximately 2645 “patents claim-
ing ‘isolated DNA’” have been issued.  Pet. App. 61a-62a.  There are 




that isolated form in nature.”  Id. at 1093.  The PTO’s 
revised Utility Examination Guidelines themselves did 
not have the force of law, id. at 1098, and they did not 
specifically address patents on DNA.  The purpose of 
soliciting public comments, moreover, was not to consid-
er whether to begin granting isolated DNA patents, or 
even to consider whether to continue that practice, but 
instead to consider the standard for determining utility 
generally.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 71,441 (Dec. 21, 1999).  
b. In these circumstances, Congress’s failure to enact 
legislation abrogating the PTO’s practice of issuing 
isolated DNA patents does not give rise to any inference 
of congressional endorsement of the PTO’s interpreta-
tion.  Unlike in J.E.M. Ag Supply, in which this Court 
inferred that Congress had approved the PTO’s practice 
of granting plant utility patents, here the PTO did not 
begin issuing isolated DNA patents after any “highly 
visible” formal administrative action that thoroughly 
explained the agency’s interpretation of the statute.  534 
U.S. at 145.  And because the correctness of the PTO’s 
practice was never challenged in litigation prior to this 
case, there was no extant judicial decision applying 
Section 101 to isolated DNA patents.      
Moreover, although bills relating to patents on genet-
ic materials have occasionally been introduced in Con-
gress, there is little “evidence that Congress considered  
*  *  *  the precise issue presented before the Court.”  
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006) (plu-
rality opinion) (citation omitted).  Most of the proposed 
bills addressed the general policy implications of patents 
on all types of genetic materials, including synthesized 
materials.  See Genomic Science and Technology Inno-
vation Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(2002); Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility 
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Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002); Life 
Patenting Moratorium Act of 1993, S. 387, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1993); see also Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 101 (pro-
hibiting use of funds to issue patents on “human organ-
ism[s]”).  Although one bill would have prohibited pa-
tents on “nucleotide sequence[s],” it was never brought 
to a vote, and its application to isolated DNA molecules 
(as opposed to the information contained in nucleotide 
sequences) is not clear from its text.  See Genomic Re-
search and Accessibility Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (2007).  Because “Congress takes no governmental 
action except by legislation,” and bills can be proposed 
and rejected for any number of reasons, none of these 
bills raises any inference that Congress approved the 
PTO’s practice of granting patents on isolated DNA.  
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 750; Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169-170 (2001); cf. 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 145 (relying on Con-
gress’s enactment of legislation reflecting the premise 
that plants could be patented).  
c. The court of appeals’ decision also reflected the 
related concern that invalidating patents on isolated 
DNA would unduly disturb the “settled expectations” of 
biotechnology patent holders and investors.  See Pet. 
App. 61a-62a (citation omitted); id. at 88a (Moore, J., 
concurring).  The patent laws are designed to promote 
the development of new and useful inventions, and to 
encourage the dissemination of knowledge that enables 
others to replicate those inventions, by offering as a 
reward a promise of exclusivity to those who satisfy the 
statutory requirements.  The PTO’s known practice of 
issuing patents for isolated DNA molecules therefore 
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could reasonably be expected to increase the incentives 
for genomic research. 
A patentee’s legitimate expectations, however, are 
always tempered by the possibility that a court could 
subsequently disagree with the PTO and hold that the 
patent is invalid under Section 101 or other provisions of 
the Patent Act.  See, e.g., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304-1305 
(invalidating diagnostic-method patent despite indus-
try’s reliance interests); Pet. App. 119a (Bryson, J., 
dissenting) (“There is no collective right of adverse 
possession to intellectual property.”).  And while the 
PTO’s practice of issuing patents for isolated DNA is 
relatively longstanding, no court had ever specifically 
upheld the patent-eligibility of isolated DNA until the 
court of appeals ruled in this case.  The reliance inter-
ests at stake here therefore are not comparable to those 
to which the Court gave weight in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
739 (2002), and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring), in which the Court considered the scope and 
contours of the judicially-created principles of prosecu-
tion-history estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents.  In 
those cases, the “settled expectations of the inventing 
community” were entitled to particular solicitude be-
cause those expectations arose from the longstanding 
judicial decisions that had initially created the relevant 
doctrines.  See Festo, 535 U.S. at 739.  Reversal of the 
court of appeals’ judgment with respect to isolated DNA 




 3. Field-specific concerns about encouraging innovation 
do not justify treating isolated DNA as patent-
eligible 
The court of appeals’ holding that isolated DNA is 
patent-eligible rested in part on the court’s desire to 
avoid the “adverse effects on innovation that a holding of 
ineligibility might cause.”  Pet. App. 62a; id. at 60a-61a; 
id. at 95a (Moore, J., concurring).  But although encour-
aging innovation is an underlying purpose of the patent 
system, the desire to encourage innovation in a particu-
lar field cannot render patent-eligible products that are 
not the result of human invention.  The prospect of pa-
tent protection for isolated genomic DNA has undoubt-
edly encouraged valuable discoveries.  By the same 
token, however, patent protection would create addi-
tional incentives to discover many difficult-to-obtain but 
clearly patent-ineligible products of nature, such as 
previously unknown mineral ores or plants growing in 
the wild.  Cf. Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130.  As this 
Court explained in Mayo, natural phenomena are not 
patentable “even though rewarding with patents those 
who discover new laws of nature and the like might well 
encourage their discovery.”  132 S. Ct. at 1301.   
The court of appeals suggested that the product-of-
nature exception to Section 101 should be given a par-
ticularly narrow construction in the biotechnology con-
text because “the biotechnology industry  *  *  *  de-
pends on patents to survive.”  Pet. App. 95a (Moore, J., 
concurring); see id. at 44a, 59a-60a.  Biotechnology re-
searchers will have ample freedom to patent their inven-
tions, however, even if isolated DNA is treated as pa-
tent-ineligible.  As a general matter, when researchers 
manipulate and alter natural substances to create new 
products that are not found in nature (as in the creation 
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of cDNA), patent-eligibility depends on the degree to 
which the purported invention differs from its naturally-
occurring antecedent.  There is no evident reason to 
assume that the standard applied to other industries is 
unsuited to the biotechnology field.  And even though 
isolated but otherwise unmodified DNA segments are 
not patent-eligible, novel methods of identifying, isolat-
ing, and using DNA molecules—and other products of 
nature—may be patented, as may any new and useful 
alteration of those molecules through human interven-
tion.    
In any event, this Court has traditionally eschewed 
the sort of industry-specific calculus that the court be-
low appeared to endorse.  In Mayo, for example, the 
Court stated that policy arguments about the need for 
financial incentives in a particular industry are general-
ly not an appropriate consideration in determining the 
scope of Section 101.  See 132 S. Ct. at 1304-1305.  This 
Court’s analysis of patent-eligibility under Section 101 
reflects an effort to strike an overall balance between 
encouraging innovation through the promise of exclusiv-
ity and preventing unduly broad and preemptive mo-
nopolies. See id. at 1294, 1305.  Because the “general 
rules” that result from that balancing “must govern 
inventive activity in many different fields of human 
endeavor,  *  *  *  the practical effects of rules that re-
flect a general effort to balance these considerations 
may differ from one field to another.”  Id. at 1305.  
While “recogniz[ing] the role of Congress in “crafting 
more finely tailored rules where necessary,” the Court 
has therefore “hesitate[d] before departing from estab-
lished general legal rules lest a new protective rule that 
seems to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen 
results in another.”  Ibid.  
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Although the incentives created by the patent laws 
have spawned enormous public benefits, the product-of-
nature exception serves important public purposes as 
well.  The judicially-created exceptions to Section 101 
reflect this Court’s understanding that “[p]atent protec-
tion is, after all, a two-edged sword.”  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1305.  The promise of exclusivity that can foster inno-
vation can also “impede the flow of information that 
might permit, indeed spur, invention,” by “raising the 
price of using  *  *  * patented” products or preventing 
others from using them at all.  Ibid.  In particular, an 
overbroad conception of patent-eligibility under Section 
101 can impose significant social costs by requiring the 
public to pay to study and exploit that which ought to be 
“free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”  
Funk Brothers, 333 U.S. at 130.  As between the reliance 
interests of patent holders whose research efforts may 
have been prompted in part by the PTO’s patenting 
standards, and the public interest in avoiding undue 
restrictions imposed by patents that effectively preempt 
natural laws and substances, the interest of the public 
has consistently been given precedence.  See Mayo, 132 
S. Ct. at 1294 (Court’s precedents “warn us against 
upholding patents that claim processes that too broadly 
preempt the use of a natural law”); Mercoid Corp. v. 
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (in the 






The judgment of the court of appeals should be af-
firmed insofar as it holds that cDNA is patent-eligible, and 
reversed insofar as it holds that isolated but otherwise 
unmodified DNA is patent-eligible. 
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